![]() Thought A Journal of Philosophy, 2, 67–72.ĭasgupta, S. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.Ĭotnoir, A. Hua-yen buddhism: The jewel net of Indra. Baumberger (Eds.), Explaining understanding: New perspectives from epistemology and philosophy of science (pp. What is understanding? An overview of recent debates in epistemology and philosophy of science. The Philosophical Quarterly, 58, 1–14.īaumberger, C., Brun, G., & Beisbart, C. Turtles all the way down: Regress, priority and fundamentality. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 72, 865–891.Ĭameron, R. Interpreting quantum entanglement: Steps towards coherentist quantum mechanics. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.Ĭalosi, C., & Morganti, M. Malden: Blackwell.īrenner, A., Anna-Sofia, M., Alexander, S., Robin, S., & Naomi, T. Sosa (Eds.), The Blackwell guide to epistemology (pp. The dialectic of foundationalism and coherentism. Priest (Eds.), Reality and its structure: Essays in fundamentality (pp. Must there be a top level? The Philosophical Quarterly, 59, 193–201.īohn, E. Reality and its structure: Essays in fundamentality. ![]() The geography of fundamentality: An overview, pp. What work the fundamental? Erkenntnis, 84, 359–379.īliss, R. Viciousness and the structure of reality. thesis, University of Melbourne.īliss, R. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical perspectives 25: Metaphysics (pp. Raven (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of metaphysical grounding (pp. Thanks to Byron Simmons for discussion on this point.Īmijee, F. In that case, claiming that the relata of grounding are things only-or, at least, such that, unlike facts, they cannot be easily multiplied-might be a way to save insularism. One may, of course, arrive at coherentism through a different route, which doesn’t presuppose a close connection between grounding and explaining, and, therefore, is consistent with grounding among things. To say that one thing explains another sounds like a category mistake, and, so, the way I understand grounding is inconsistent with things grounding each other (although facts about things certainly may do so). But the cost of this response is that the natural relata of explanations are facts. I don’t consider this answer promising because I think that the best arguments for coherentism (and against foundationalism) about ground have to do with the way grounding is supposed to explain, and how explanations tend to have coherent, symmetric, or mutually-supporting structural features. Although these moves are both unorthodox, I don’t consider either absurd. Since, on this suggestion, the “mediated” relationship is not identical to grounding, it amounts to a plausible denial of transitivity, and represents an alternative to Thompson’s suggestion. That caveat is that things don’t end up getting grounded in a kind of direct way by all the other participants of the grounding web: they are only grounded by their immediate “neighbors” and are related in a sort of mediated way to other participants in the web. On the other hand, transitivity could be denied with a similar caveat. Something may end up grounding itself, just because of how it is bound up with other things. Denying irreflexivity, then, might be combined with the clarification that things only contribute to grounding themselves in a derivative way: facts will ground themselves because of their relationship with other facts. ![]() But rejecting either becomes far more plausible once we consider that any plausible coherentist web will be relatively large: many connections would be exceedingly tenuous, connecting things only through the mediation of others, in a kind of indirect way. Thompson ( 2020, 264) suggests that views which maintain mutual grounding should deny irreflexivity. To my mind, this represents a choice-point for coherentists. Coherentists must reject asymmetry, and, since asymmetry is implied by the combination of irreflexivity and transitivity, one of the latter two as well. Often, grounding is assumed to be a strict partial order: irreflexive, transitive, and asymmetric. One debate which I bracket concerns the formal properties of coherentist grounding.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |